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ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE STATE TO
PRODUCE THE WRITTEN INVENTORY SEARCH POLICY.
A. To the Extent That the Trial Court Employed a Rule 1002
Analysis, it Is Bound to Apply it Correctly and to Require
the State to Produce the Written Policy for Inventory
Searches.
The State asserts that the trial court did not err in
refusing to require the written policy of the Sheriff's
Department regarding inventory searches pursuant to Utah Rule of
Evidence 10 02 (1998) since the rules of evidence are not
applicable at suppression hearings.

See State's Brief ("S.B.")

at 7; see also Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1998); Utah R. Evid. 104(a)
(1998).1

However, the trial court did err in admitting the

Utah R. Evid. 1101(b) provides:
The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not
apply [to] . . . (1) preliminary questions of fact which are
to be determined under Rule 104 (a) .
Utah R. Evid. 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the . . . admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court. . . . In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
1

evidence under Rule 1002 to the extent that all parties involved the court, the State, and Clifford - engaged in a Rule 1002
analysis and the court rendered a decision that was erroneous.
At the suppression hearing, the State elicited testimony
from Deputy Blanton ("Blanton"), the searching officer, regarding
his understanding of the written procedures for an inventory
search.

R.MH12.

The following colloquy and ruling occurred with

regard to Clifford's Rule 1002 challenge:
Clifford: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I don't think
this officer can testify as to the department's procedure,
and that's because under Rule 1002 of the Rules of Evidence
-- known as the Best Evidence Rule -- if [] the state is
attempting to offer the contents of a writing, they must
produce that writing itself. [The State is] asking the
officer to testify as to their written [] procedure or
policy . . . they need to introduce that written policy or
procedure
Court:

How do we know it's written?

Clifford:
Court:

We don't . . . can I voir dire [Blanton]?

If you w a n t . . . .
VOIR DIRE

Clifford: Does the Sheriff's Department have a written
policy or procedure . . . for search and seizure?
Blanton:

They do.

Clifford: And were you acting pursuant to that policy and
procedure?
Blanton:
Court:

I was. . . .

And so your (Clifford) objection is what?

Clifford: That they have to introduce the written policy .
. . to establish . . . what the procedure is. . . .
State: Your Honor, I believe that he has been trained in
such. . . . I'll lay some foundation for that.
2

Court: So you (Clifford) think this is Rule 1002 or
something?
Clifford:

1002.

Court: 1002. And you (the State) think you can create some
foundation for it?
State: Your Honor, I would ask to lay a foundation by
asking the officer if he's been trained by these policies
and what his training was: what it was that he was taught to
do.
Court: So you're not going to worry about what the policy
is, but you're going to ask him what he was trained to do?
State:

Right.

His understanding of the policy.

Court:

And would you (Clifford) object to that?

Clifford: I would.
[Be]cause his understanding of the
policy is what the policy says, and I think the best
evidence of that is is [sic] the policy itself.
Court: Well, clearly, yeah, his understanding wouldn't be
what it says; it would be his understanding. So we'll go
ahead and let him testify as to what his understanding is.
R.MH12-15.
It is clear from the above colloquy that all parties engaged
in an articulate Rule 1002 argument.

Id.

Above all, it is

evident that the judge rendered a decision based on those
arguments, especially since he employed the typical language of a
Rule 1002 analysis (i.e., refusing to require written policy
because Blanton would be testifying only to his "understanding"
of the policy and not the policy itself).

R.MH15; see, e.g.

McCormick et al., McCormick On Evidence § 231 (2d ed. 1972)
(discussing Best Evidence Rule implications when witness
testifies as to "recollection" of contents of writing).
To the extent that the parties presented arguments in terms
3

of Rule 1002, and the trial court ruled on those arguments, it's
decision is reviewable on that basis.

The Utah Supreme Court in

other contexts has held that an issue is reviewable, although not
properly before the trial court, where the judge nonetheless
rules on the issue on its merits.

See,e.g. State v. Johnson, 821

P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (" [b]ecause the trial court addressed
the corpus delicti issue fully and did not rely on waiver, we
consider the issue on appeal, even though trial counsel failed to
properly preserve it as required by Utah Rule of Evidence
103(a) (1)") (citing State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah
1991)); see also State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993).
This is so because "the trial court ha[d] the first opportunity
to address a claim that it erred."

Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161.

Given that the trial court here decided the Rule 1002 issue on
its merits, its decision is subject to review on that basis as
well.
The trial court's decision is reviewable under Rule 1002 for
the added reason that it did so erroneously.

"While Utah R.

Evid. 104(a) does not require the [trial] court to apply the
Rules of Evidence to questions of admissibility of evidence
generally, the court is not bound to disregard those rules."
State By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v.
Ruscetta 742 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah App. 1987) (trial court did not
abuse discretion in applying Utah Rules of Evidence to issue of
unavailability of witness).

To the extent that the court does

utilize the rules, it is bound to do so correctly and uniformly
4

in order to avoid arbitrary application of the law.
Const, amend.

See

U.S.

XIV - Equal Protection Clause (requiring that

similarly situated individuals be treated alike under the law
unless there is a reasonable basis for treating them
differently); Utah Const, art.
Laws (same).

I, § 24 - Uniform Operation of

Given that the court opted to apply a Rule 1002

analysis, its ruling is subject to review to the extent that it
misconstrued the necessity for the written procedure under that
rule.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court's decision should
not be affirmed simply because it was not bound to apply the
evidentiary rules.

To the extent that it engaged in a Rule 1002

analysis and did so erroneously, it's decision is, in fact,
reviewable on that basis.2

Moreover, requiring the State to

provide the written policy was the only method of insuring the
inherent reliability of such critical evidence.
B. The Written Policy Was Required To Ensure The
Reliability Of Critical Evidence Concerning Inventory Search
Policy.
The trial court's erroneous refusal to require the written
policy is likewise reviewable on the basis that, without the
written document, the trial court did not ensure the inherent

As to the Rule 1002 issue on appeal, the State only
asserts that the court was not bound by the rule and hence did
not abuse its discretion in failing to require the written
policy. S.B.7-8. The State does not discuss why the ruling was
correct under Rule 1002. Id. Accordingly, Clifford submits on
his opening brief regarding the trial court's error in not
requiring the written policy pursuant to Rule 1002. See
Appellant's Opening Brief ("A.B.") at 9-15.
5

reliability of evidence going to the critical issue of whether a
policy existed and whether Blanton followed it.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "[a]lthough not bound by
the Rules of Evidence in a suppression hearing, a trial judge
must weigh the reliability . . . of material presented to aid in
the decision to admit or exclude evidence."
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987).

State v. Branch, 743

Put another way, the judge may not

admit evidence that does not bear "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct.

2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 815, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).
In the present case, Blanton's testimony standing alone did
not bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
448 U.S. at 66.

Ohio,

As the searching officer, an agent of the

government, and the prosecution's primary witness, Blanton had an
interest in relaying his understanding of the inventory search
procedure in a light most favorable to his actions and in a
manner that would promote admission of the gun.

Moreover, given

the inherent weakness of human recall, Blanton's testimony
regarding his understanding of the procedure risked that he would
mistransmit what the policy actually stated.
Given the risks and weaknesses of Blanton's recollected
testimony, the trial court erred in failing to compel the State
to produce the written policy.

The written document, in contrast

to Blanton's testimony, would have provided the court with
accurate information going to a dispositive issue, namely the
6

existence of and Blanton's adherence to a standard inventory
search procedure.

Absent the written document, the judge was

left to sift through Blanton's testimony alone in determining the
validity of this inventory search, thereby compromising the
truth-finding function of the judge.
In light of the foregoing, this Court should review the
trial court's clearly erroneous refusal to compel the State to
produce the written inventory search procedure.
II. EVEN IF A RULE 1002 ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE, THE
INVENTORY SEARCH WOULD STILL FAIL SINCE THE OFFICER DID NOT
ESTABLISH THAT HE FOLLOWED A STANDARDIZED PROCEDURE.
A. Blanton Did Not Demonstrate A Certain Knowledge Of
Inventory Search Procedure.
The State cites this Court's opinion in State v. Stricklinq,
844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992) for the proposition that a
searching officer need only testify about department inventory
search policy in order for the prosecution to meet its burden to
establish such procedure.

S.B.9.

The State, however, oversimplifies the Stricklinq decision.
Stricklinq actually requires that an officer's testimony
regarding inventory search procedure must demonstrate a "certain
knowledge" and be "probative" of the issue.
also A.B.15.

844 P.2d at 990; see

Contrary to the State's assertion, Officer

Blanton's testimony is not analogous to that of the officer who
testified in Stricklinq and thus does not meet these criteria.
Indeed, far from evincing a "close familiarity with [inventory
search] policies," S.B.10, Blanton's testimony is distinguishable
from the much more detailed information offered by the officer in
7

Strickling in that it is too generalized to be probative of
whether and to what extent an inventory search procedure existed.
See A.B.15-17 (discussing how Blanton's testimony falls short of
demonstrating "probative," "certain knowledge" of inventory
search policy).
In addition to misconstruing the Strickling requirements for
officer testimony, the State also ignores the fact that Blanton
testified that he is authorized to conduct inventory searches
according to his own discretion even though some rules are in
place.

R.MH31.

Discretionary authority implies that there is,

in effect, no binding policy and runs counter to the trial
court's finding that a policy existed.

R.MH43.

Indeed, the fact

that Blanton may exercise discretion in conducting an inventory
search flies in the face the very rationale for requiring a
standardized policy in the first place, namely to "guard[]
against arbitrariness when police conduct warrantless inventory
searches."

Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987-88 (citing 3 Wayne R.

LeFave, Search And Seizure § 7.4(a) at 109 (2d ed. 1987); State
v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah App. 1988)).
In light of the foregoing, the State's argument is not
compelling.

In fact, the trial court clearly erred in

determining that the search at issue here was conducted pursuant
to . . . policy," R.MH43, where such finding goes "against the
clear weight of the evidence" presented below.

Strickling, 844

P.2d at 981.
B. Blanton 7 s Testimony Did Not Establish That He Followed
An Inventory Search Policy.
8

The State additionally asserts that Blanton's testimony
established that he followed a policy in carrying out the
inventory search of Clifford's car.

S.B.10-13.

In so arguing,

the State looks at the facts of this case in isolation.
Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, however, the
facts actually establish that Blanton did not adhere to any sort
of policy in conducting this search.

Assuming but not conceding

that an inventory search procedure was established, Blanton's
testimony indicated that he complied with such policy only to the
extent that his discretion did not direct him to do otherwise.
See supra Point II.A.
Moreover, as Blanton himself admitted, he carried out the
inventory search only insofar as he looked in the passenger area
and in the driver's side door pouch.

R.MH11.

Although Blanton

acknowledged that the primary purpose of an inventory is to
secure personal property and avoid false claims of theft, he
failed to look in obvious areas of the truck where valuables are
likely to be found, such as the glove compartment or in the bed
of the truck.
986.

R.MH26-27,34; see also Stricklinq, 844 P.2d at

In addition, Blanton testified that he is required to make

a written list of all the items he finds during an inventory.
R.MH3 0.

Nonetheless, he did not complete the state impound tax

form, listing only the contraband found, such as the gun and
three open beer containers, but not Clifford's tools, which might
have been the subject of a later claim of theft.

R.MH10,25,27.

Blanton's failure to adhere to a standard policy runs
9

counter to the purpose and justification of inventory searches.
As noted by this Court in Stricklincr,
[i]nventory searches . . . constitute an exception to the
warrant requirement because such a search is not conducted
to investigate criminal activity and no variant of
individualized suspicion is necessary to permit one.
Instead, police conduct such inventory searches to protect
property in the car, to protect police against the claim of
theft, and to protect police form potential danger.
844 P.2d at 986 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

Where Blanton

failed to adhere to any sort of policy, there were not sufficient
assurances that this warrantless intrusion into Clifford7 s
privacy was not "limited in scope to the extent necessary to
carry out the caretaking function."

Id. at 988 (citing Opperman,

428 U.S. at 375).
Nonetheless, the State dismisses Blanton's failure to adhere
to policy on the basis that his attention was turned toward
Clifford's arrest after the gun was discovered and that another
officer stepped in to complete the inventory.

S.B.11-13.

However, such glaring deficits in this inventory cannot be cured
by these facts alone.

If anything, they reveal Blanton's

investigatory motive and his haste to arrest Clifford.

See infra

Point III; A.B.Point III (discussing invalidity of inventory
search under pretext doctrine).

If Blanton was sincerely

conducting an inventory, he could have put Clifford in the care
of the other officer present while he completed the search
himself.

At the very least, he could have listed the tools he

found during the course of his portion of the search.
10

R.MH27.

Absent any indicia of sincerity, however, the trial court's
finding that Blanton adhered to procedure, R.MH43, as well as the
State's argument on appeal, lack merit.
III. THE INVENTORY SEARCH IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS
CONDUCTED AS A PRETEXT TO AN INVESTIGATORY POLICE MOTIVE.
The State agrees with Clifford that the "inventory search
exception to the requirement of a warrant does not apply when the
inventory search is actually a pretext to an 'investigatory
police motive.'"
268 (Utah 1985)).

S.B.13 (quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,
The State notes further that "[t]he existence

of regularized procedures for handling inventory searches play a
role identical to that of search warrants in guarding against
arbitrariness in who and what officers select to search.
Inventories that were not conducted in compliance with department
policies should not be upheld under Qpperman."

S.B.13 (citing

Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987); see, e.g., A.B.n.9.

To the extent

that neither a standard policy nor Blanton's adherence thereto
was established, see supra Point II; A.B. Point II, this search
is invalid.
Although Clifford submits on his opening brief, see A.B.
Point III, in response to the State's argument that this was not
a pretextual inventory search, a few added comments bear
mentioning.

As an initial matter, the State challenges

Clifford's reliance on Hygh for the proposition that Blanton's
failure to involve Clifford in the disposition of his belongings
prior to initiating an inventory search is indicative of pretext.
S.B.15.

The State distinguishes Hygh on the basis that the
11

officer in that case was required to question the defendant about
his valuables and, in failing to do so, "deviated from department
procedure."

S.B.15.

The State alternatively cites State v.

Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987), for the argument that
Blanton was not required under the Fourth Amendment to give
Clifford the opportunity to make arrangements for his valuables.
S.B.16.

To the extent that Blanton was not required by either

policy or the constitution to give Clifford such opportunity, the
state argues that his failure to do so is not indicative of
pretext.
While the State's reading of Hvah and Johnson is technically
correct, it misses the overall lesson to be learned from other
cases touching on this topic.

As noted in Opperman, the greater

inquiry concerns the reasonableness
U.S. at 373.

of the inventory search.

428

Whether a particular act is required by the Fourth

Amendment or standardized policy is not the end of the inquiry.
See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375 (without discussing
procedure or specific acts mandated by the Fourth Amendment,
Court held inventory search was not pretextual where defendant
was "not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping
of his belongings"); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983)
(without discussing procedure, Court determines inventory search
is not pretextual because officers "allowed Cole to take an
personal items . . . prior to the inventory" even though it is
not constitutionally required).

Accordingly, evidence that an

officer gave a defendant the opportunity to dispose of his own
12

belongings prior to initiating an impound and inventory search
becomes a mark of reasonableness for purposes of a pretext
analysis where the policy or Fourth Amendment jurisprudence do
not otherwise prescribe it.

Hence, the State's contention on

appeal is unfounded; Blanton's failure to involve Clifford in the
disposition of his truck and belongings, although not required by
either policy or Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is indicative of
his pretextual motive.
In any event, the State contends that Blanton could not have
given Clifford this option since Clifford was an uninsured driver
and his companion was inebriated.

S.B.16.

Contrary to the

State's assertion, however, the circumstances of the present case
indicate that it would have been reasonable and entirely
practicable for Blanton to give Clifford a chance to dispose of
his property.

As noted in his opening brief, Clifford was at

liberty to make other arrangements if Blanton had allowed him to
do so.

A.B.25.

Clifford was not yet under arrest at the time

Blanton initiated the search and he had a cell phone from which
he could call family or a friend to remove the truck.
28,31.

R.MH27-

Moreover, the evidence does not otherwise indicate that

allowing Clifford to make arrangements at this time would have
been impracticable for Blanton.
In light of the foregoing, Blanton's failure to allow
Clifford to make arrangements for his truck and his belongings
was unreasonable and highlights his pretextual motive.

Based on

the discussion herein and in Clifford's opening brief, A.B. Point
13

Ill, the trial court erred in finding that the inventory search
at issue was not invalid as a pretext to an investigation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and the argument set forth in his
opening brief, Clifford respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's order admitting the illegally seized
gun, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the case to
allow Clifford to withdraw his guilty plea.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument.
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